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"Freedom of the press is not restricted to the operation of linotype
machines and printing presses. A rotary press needs raw material
like a flour mill needs wheat. A print shop without material to
print would be as meaningless as a vineyard without grapes, an
orchard without trees, or a lawn without verdure."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The dissonance between the right to a fair trial and the freedom
of the press strikes a familiar, albeit disharmonious, chord. A brief
1. In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1956).
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glance at history demonstrates the perpetual conflict between these
equally dynamic concepts.2 On the one hand, judges endeavor to pro-
tect the rights of the criminally accused against potentially prejudicial
interference by the press.' On the other hand, the press4 seeks to pre-
serve its reportorial role via the right to free expression.
The United States Constitution fortifies both fair trial and free
press concerns. While the sixth amendment mandates that "an
impartial jury"5 shall judge the criminally accused, the first amend-
ment forbids the government from "abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press."'6 Although the amendments do not conflict on their
face, in practice, their confrontation precipitates heated debate to
determine the priority of the underlying rights.'
The judiciary has not responded casually to this constitutional
contest. Trial judges, with an eye toward protecting the defendant's
right to a fair trial, frequently issue orders restricting the extrajudicial
speech of trial participants.' These "gag" orders typically prohibit
2. For a summary treatment of some of the most publicized cases in American history,
see J. LOFrON, JUSTICE AND THE PRESS 71-110 (1966).
3. In 1807, defense counsel in the treason trial of Colonel Aaron Burr argued that
prejudicial publicity had infected the jurors' minds. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). Chief Justice Marshall agreed, stating that "[t]he jury
should enter upon the trial with minds open to those impressions which the testimony and the
law of the case ought to make, not with those preconceived opinions which will resist those
impressions." Id. at 50. A century later, Justice Holmes stated that "the conclusions to be
reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any
outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." Patterson v. Colorado ex reL
Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
4. This Comment uses the terms "press" and "media" interchangeably to include the
various forms of publication such as newspaper, magazine, radio, and television.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment right to an impartial jury also applies
to state criminal defendants through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722
(1961) ("The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of
due process.").
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Incorporation of the first amendment into the fourteenth
amendment requires that first amendment restrictions apply with equal force to the states.
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ("It is no longer open to doubt that
the liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.").
7. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) ("[F]ree speech and fair trials are
two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose
between them.").
8. See In re New York Times Co., 878 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Dow Jones & Co.,
842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988); Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem,
801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986); Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court,
781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Connecticut
Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38 (D. Conn. 1987); Central S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of
Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 556
F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); KPNX Broadcasting Co. v.
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persons connected with the trial from speaking with the media about
the case during a specified time period.9
Gag orders serve primarily to protect the integrity of both the
jury selection and deliberation processes. With respect to jury selec-
tion, gag orders theoretically prevent the general public from hearing
potentially prejudicial comments prior to trial, and the orders thereby
substantially increase the pool of prospective impartial jurors."° Once
a jury has been selected, gag orders further prevent irrelevant or prej-
udicial information, which may taint the deliberation process, from
reaching the jurors. In other words, journalists frequently pursue
information "that satisfies reader curiosity, that is sensational and...
that sells newspapers or boosts ratings.""I But much of the informa-
tion that is "sensational," however, is also inadmissible in a court of
law.' 2 Given the general mistrust of a juror's ability to separate
admissible from inadmissible evidence, gag orders arguably preserve
"the protective effect of the ...exclusionary rules of evidence" by
precluding extrajudicial publication of inadmissible evidence.13
Despite the popularity of gag orders in the ranks of the judiciary,
the orders have not gone unchallenged by persons who believe that
such orders infringe upon their first amendment rights. Attorneys, 4
parties, 5 and witnesses' 6 directly restrained from speaking with the
media have attacked the constitutionality of gag orders as prior
restraints on free speech. This Comment does not, however, focus on
the concerns of persons directly restrained by injunctions. Rather,
this Comment addresses the predicament that arises when news agen-
cies challenge the validity of gag orders that do not directly restrain
Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984); Florida Freedom Newspapers v.
McCrary, 520 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Young, 522 F.2d at 236 (ordering "all counsel and Court personnel, all
parties concerned with this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants, their relatives, close
friends, and associates ... to refrain from discussing in any manner whatsoever these cases
with members of the news media or the public").
10. See Sigma Delta Chi, 431 F. Supp. at 1189 (Prejudical information disseminated prior
to trial "has the effect of making more difficult the selection of an impartial jury.").
11. Free Press-Fair Trial.' An Introduction, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 640, 641 (1976).
12. Id. at 640-41 ("Editorial policy regarding the selection and reporting of news differs
dramatically from rules governing the admission of evidence in criminal trials.").
13. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 comment (1983); see also
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360 (1966) (exclusionary rules "rendered meaningless
when news media make [inadmissible evidence] available to the public").
14. See, e.g., Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990
(1969) (defendants challenged order prohibiting public discussion of their case).
16. See, e.g., In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984).
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the media's right to publish, but that do restrain the extrajudicial
speech of trial participants and thereby frustrate the media's attempts
to gather information.
Specifically, this Comment attempts to unravel the doctrine of
prior restraint in terms of indirect restraining orders.17 Section II of
this Comment explores the historical origins and judicial interpreta-
tions of prior restraint, addresses the conflict in the appellate court
decisions that have discussed the indirect gag order issue, and ana-
lyzes the definitional dispute at the crux of the issue. Section III dis-
cusses the rights to gather news and to receive communications in
terms of their relationship with the prior restraint doctrine.18 Finally,
in Section IV, this Comment concludes that the United States
Supreme Court should take up the indirect gag order issue to deter-
mine the contours of the constitutional doctrine of prior restraint.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
A. The Origins of the Concept
Like many constitutional theories, the doctrine of prior restraint,
although centuries old, has not yet crystallized into a hard and fast
principle.19 Nonetheless, the words of Professor Emerson constitute a
helpful, albeit elastic, definition of prior restraint: Prior restraint is an
"official restriction[ ] imposed upon speech or other forms of expres-
sion in advance of actual publication," as opposed to subsequent pun-
ishment which penalizes the disseminator "after the communication
has been made as a punishment for having made it."20
Analysis of the prior restraint doctrine necessarily begins with its
English origins. 2' The prior restraint doctrine gradually emerged in
17. This Comment refers to restraining orders that specifically prohibit the media from
disseminating certain information as "direct" gag orders. In contrast, this Comment identifies
restraining orders that prohibit trial participants from speaking to the press, but that do not
specifically restrain the press from publication, as "indirect" gag orders. The latter term
accurately conveys that gag orders against trial participants indisputably target news agencies
even though the orders do not literally restrain the media.
18. The right to gather news, the right to receive communications, and prior restraint are
so interrelated in this context that any attempt to separate them is concededly artificial. See
Schmidt & Volner, Nebraska Press Association: An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L. REV.
529, 535 (1977) (commenting that first amendment analysis "give[s] credence to those theorists
who hold that the law is a seamless web"). Nonetheless, by treating these concepts as separate,
yet dependent, strands of the same issue, this Comment seeks to avoid the trap of loose
terminology and muddy analysis.
19. See Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 419 (1983).
20. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648,.648
(1955) (emphasis added).
21. For a more comprehensive look at the English history of prior restraint, see J.
LoFrON, supra note 2, at 6-10.
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England in the fifteenth century with the advent of the printing
press. 22 By the seventeenth century, all printing affairs were under
the Crown's monopolistic control.23 Of particular importance, the
Licensing Act of 1662 prohibited publication of seditious and hereti-
cal material and further required a license before disseminating any
printed matter.24 In 1695, the Licensing Act expired and was never
reinstituted.25 Ironically, the House of Commons did not condemn
the licensing system as inherently evil, but it instead cited numerous
administrative burdens as justification for the termination.26
Eventually, however, freedom from licensing systems "came to
assume the status of a common law or natural right."' 27 This common
sentiment ultimately found its way into the first amendment, 28 elevat-
ing the concept "to the status of constitutional principle. '29 As a con-
stitutional principle, the doctrine "forbids the Federal Government
[and the states through incorporation of the first amendment into the
fourteenth amendment] to impose any system of prior restraint, with
certain limited exceptions, in any area of expression that is within the
boundaries of [the First] Amendment. '30 Notwithstanding the doc-
trine's constitutional gloss, more than a century passed before the
United States Supreme Court recognized the prohibition of prior
restraint as a vital constitutional concept in Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson. 31
22. Id. at 6.
23. Emerson, supra note 20, at 650.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 651.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52 ("[L]iberty of the press is
indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.").
28. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
29. Emerson, supra note 20, at 652.
30. Id. at 648; see also Near, 283 U.S. at 716 ("[L]iberty of the press, historically
considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship."); A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT 61 (1975) ("[It is the hypothesis of the First Amendment that injury is inflicted
on our society when we stifle the immediacy of speech.").
31. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Although the doctrine prohibiting prior restraint has emerged as
a concept of constitutional proportions, some critics doubt its utility as a first amendment
doctrine. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 19, at 437 (noting that current use of prior restraint
doctrine "is so far removed from its historic function, so variously invoked and discrepantly
applied ... that it no longer warrants use as an independent category of First Amendment
analysis"). Critics also question the validity of the traditional view that prior restraint restricts
first amendment freedoms more than subsequent punishment. See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 4.04, at
4-25 (1984) ("[T]he reasons for the distinction are questionable, and, at the very least, confused
and distorted."); Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 551 (1977)
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B. Judicial Interpretation of the Doctrine
1. THE SOURCE OF MODERN PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE: Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 32 is the watershed case address-
ing the issue of prior restraint.33 In Near, the Supreme Court
reviewed the "Minnesota Gag Law,"34 which provided that any per-
son "engaged in the business" of publishing "malicious, scandalous
and defamatory" material could be enjoined from further publica-
tion. 35  The case commenced when a county attorney brought an
action against the publisher of The Saturday Press, alleging a violation
of the statute through the periodical's "malicious, scandalous and
defamatory" attacks against law enforcement officials.36 The trial
court's ruling, which was affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court,37 "perpetually enjoined" the defendants from further publica-
tion of such matter.38
Although the Supreme Court was not confronted with a licensing
scheme per se, the majority found that the statute in dispute operated
much like the English censoring system.39 Consequently, the Court
struck down the statute because it "provide[d]... for suppression and
injunction, that is, for restraint upon publication."'  The Near Court
thus expanded the prior restraint doctrine, which traditionally applied
only to licensing schemes, to encompass injunctions on speech and
("[Tihe pinpointed freeze of a narrowly drawn gag order might produce less refrigeration
overall than the broader chill of threatened subsequent punishment."); Freund, The Supreme
Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 539 (1951) ("The generalization that prior
restraint is particularly obnoxious ... must yield to more particularistic analysis."); Jeffries,
supra note 19, at 419 (arguing that the judiciary has offered "no coherent basis" for making
distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment); Mayton, Toward a Theory of
First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the
Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 281 (1982) (injunctions carry "a
significantly lesser cost to speech" than subsequent punishment). But see Emerson, supra note
20, at 656-60 (listing characteristics of prior restraint that justify treating it separately from
subsequent punishment); Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 29,
29 ("[P]rior restraint, even if lifted on appeal, rob[s] a story of its timeliness ... while a story
later found libelous or in contempt of court ma[kes] its way into print.").
32. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
33. For a comprehensive review of Near, see F. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG (1981).
34. Near, 283 U.S. at 702.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 703-04. Specifically, the articles in dispute denounced public officers for failing
to take action against a gangster. Id. at 704.
37. State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 179 Minn. 40, 228 N.W. 326 (1929).
38. Near, 283 U.S. at 706.
39. See id. at 713 (stating that the statute "put[s] the publisher under an effective
censorship," much like the licensing system which was rejected in England).
40. Id. at 715.
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publication. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, validated
the leap by concluding that. the statute was inconsistent "with the
conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and
guaranteed."4
The Near dissent objected to the majority's historical conception.
Justice Butler argued that the statute in question did not operate as a
previous restraint as that doctrine was originally contemplated.42
According to Justice Butler, the majority's finding of a "similarity
between the ... statute [preventing] further publication ... and the
previous restraint upon the press by licensers" bordered on the
absurd.43
Justice Butler correctly observed that the Minnesota statute only
authorized the use of an injunction subsequent to the offense, and
therefore did not by its terms restrain publishers prior to publica-
tion." Nonetheless, by subjecting publishers to the discretion of a
single judge without a jury, the statute effectively placed judges in the
position of censors; "any publisher seeking to avoid prison would, in
sheer self-protection, have to clear in advance any doubtful matter
with the official wielding such direct, immediate, and unimpeded
power to sentence. '45 Thus, the statute by its "operation and effect"
acted as an unconstitutional prior restraint.46 This broad interpreta-
tion by a slim majority47 has since served as the cornerstone for prior
restraint analysis.48
2. THE DEMISE OF DIRECT GAG ORDERS AGAINST THE PRESS:
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
The Supreme Court addressed the dual considerations of prior
restraint on publication and the right to an impartial jury in Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart.4 9 The dispute in Nebraska Press arose out
of a murder trial in which the defendant was accused of murdering six
41. Id. at 713.
42. Id. at 735 (Butler, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 736.
44. Id. at 735.
45. Emerson, supra note 20, at 654.
46. Near, 283 U.S. at 709.
47. A five-to-four majority decided the case. See id. at 697.
48. The pronouncement in Near accounts for the popular opinion that injunctions
prohibiting future publication utterly fail under the prior restraint doctrine. See Blasi, Toward
a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 15 (1981)
(Injunctions are at "the core of the prior restraint doctrine."); Jeffries, supra note 19, at 426
(modem prior restraint doctrine understood as "rule of special hostility to injunctions"). But
see Mayton, supra note 31, at 249 ("Injunctions against speech.., are not the kind of restraint
that the 'English experience' teaches us to abhor.").
49. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). Although Nebraska Press represents a milestone in and of itself,
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family members in a rural Nebraska community.50 Due to the highly
sensational nature of the case, the tria, court issued a gag order to
prevent prejudicial information from reaching potential jurors. 51 The
order, in the form presented to the Supreme Court, prohibited the
publication of "the existence and nature of any confessions," except
those made to the press, and "other facts 'strongly implicative' of the
accused." '52
The Court unanimously ruled in favor of the news media, hold-
ing that the gag order constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint
on publication.5 3  A single statement captured the constitutional
underpinnings of the Court's decision: "[P]rior restraints on speech
and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights."'5 4 The Court specifically referred
to the dichotomy between prior restraint and subsequent punishment,
stating that while "a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publica-
tion 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." 55
Although the majority opinion refused to accord the first amend-
ment absolute priority over the sixth amendment, 56 the test that
emerged from Nebraska Press assured the " 'heavy presumption'
against [the] constitutional validity" of prior restraints.57 Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Burger erected a tripartite test to determine
whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, jus-
the opinion also provides a helpful survey of some of the major decisions relating to the tension
between free press and fair trial considerations up to that point. Id. at 548-59.
50. Id. at 542.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 545.
53. Id. at 570. For diverse viewpoints on the validity and impact of this holding, see
Symposium: Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1976-1977).
54. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559.
55. Id. (borrowing the famous metaphor from A. BICKEL, supra note 30, at 61).
56. Id. at 561. The concurring opinions, however, hedged toward an absolutist stance.
Justice Brennan, along with Justices Stewart and Marshall, would have adopted an
unconditional ban on gagging the press, arguing that prior restraint "on the freedom of the
press is a constitutionally impermissible method for enforcing" fair trial concerns. Id. at 572
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens suggested that he might accept Justice Brennan's
conclusion if faced squarely with the issue. Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice White
expressed "grave doubt" as to whether gag orders against the press "would ever be justifiable,"
but declined to join Justice Brennan on this case of first impression. Id. at 570-71 (White, J.,
concurring).
57. Id. at 558 (quoting Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
181 (1968)). But see STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Fair Trial and Free Press, Standard
8-3.1 commentary at 8-29 (1978) ("Rather than invite courts to probe the limits of the first
amendment in this area . . . it is preferable to close the door entirely to the alternative of
[direct] prior restraints."); Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 411, 414 (1977) (arguing that the majority's position would not, in the short term,
sufficiently deter trial courts from imposing gag orders against the press).
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tifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger.",5 8 This test consists of a close examination of: (1) "the nature
and extent of pretrial news coverage";5 9 (2) the availability of less
restrictive alternatives;6' and (3) the effectiveness of the disputed
restraining order.61
In applying the test to the facts in Nebraska Press, the Supreme
Court analyzed the three factors individually. First, the Court found
that the trial judge could have reasonably determined that the prob-
able nature and extent of pretrial publicity might interfere with the
defendant's constitutional rights.6 2 Despite this justifiable concern,
the Court concluded that the trial court failed to adequately investi-
gate less restrictive alternatives.63 To overcome the second hurdle of
the test, the court issuing the order must make "express findings" of
the insufficiency of those less restrictive alternatives."' Finally, the
Court listed several setbacks that marred the effectiveness of the
Nebraska Press gag order, setbacks which included jurisdictional limi-
tations, the difficulty in drafting a properly tailored order, and the
impossibility of containing the community rumor mill.65 In sum, the
Court concluded that the record did not overcome "the heavy burden
of demonstrating, in advance of trial, that without prior restraint a
fair trial [would] be denied." 66
Although Nebraska Press was generally considered a coup for the
media, issues left undecided dampened the victory.67 Specifically, the
Court did not resolve the issue of whether the press could successfully
challenge an indirect gag order, as opposed to an order directed spe-
cifically at the press, as an unconstitutional prior restraint. 68 To date,
58. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562 (quoting Learned Hand's test in United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court listed the following as less restrictive alternatives: (1) change of venue
for trial; (2) continuance of trial until publicity abates; (3) in-depth voir dire; (4) forceful jury
instructions to decide the issues only on the presented evidence; and (5):jury sequestration. Id.
at 563-64 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)). The Court also noted
that Sheppard suggested the use of gag orders against trial participants to control publicity,
Id. at 564 (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361-62 (dictum)).
61. Id. at 562.
62. Id. at 562-63.
63. Id. at 565.
64. Id. at 563.
65. Id. at 565-67.
66. Id. at 569.
67. See Sack, supra note 57, at 412 (The Nebraska Press decision leaves "a residue of
apprehension, a sense that, although the guarantees of a free press may have been vindicated in
this case, they might not be next time.").
68. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 564 n.8.
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the Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to decide this issue,69
leaving perhaps too much discretion and lack of direction to the lower
courts dealing with this problem.7"
3. THE Nebraska Press END RUN: "GAGGING" TRIAL
PARTICIPANTS
Soon after the Supreme Court handed down its decision, it was
evident that Nebraska Press represented merely a hollow threat.7 As
predicted by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, the
future issuance of orders restraining trial participants would "consti-
tute a serious backdoor threat to First Amendment interests [and
would] ... presage the next wave of free press-fair trial litigation."72
Thus, as sure as Nebraska Press guaranteed the demise of unjustifiable
orders that directly restrain the press, it provoked the unprincipled
use of gag orders that, instead, indirectly restrain the press by
restraining trial participants.73
a. The Birth of the Indirect Gag Order: Sheppard v. Maxwell
Courts have justified the widespread use of indirect gag orders by
relying on Sheppard v. Maxwell,74 a pre-Nebraska Press Supreme
Court decision that is sometimes attributed with giving "birth" to the
gag order.75 The facts in Sheppard indicate that the trial court may
69. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988). Justice White, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have granted the petition for certiorari because of the
importance of the issue and the conflict in the appellate courts. Id. at 378 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens did not take part in the decision. Id.
70. Professor Benno Schmidt noted the irony that, despite the serious constitutional
implications of Nebraska Press, the decision "was handed down in a frantic final week of the
most crowded term in the Court's history." Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An
Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 475 (1977). He
suggested that the Court's opinion may have met "time pressures" at the expense of clarity,
which may account for the continued speculation on the true significance of the case. Id.
71. See Prettyman, .Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Have We Seen the Last of Prior
Restraints on the Reporting of Judicial Proceedings?, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 654, 661-62 (1976)
(noting that one future problem will be determining "the extent to which courts can, or should,
impose restraints on persons who might normally be expected to speak with members of the
press"); Sack, supra note 57, at 427 (As direct restraining orders against the press become
obsolete, "orders silencing [trial participants] are likely to become widespread."); Schmidt &
Volner, supra note 18, at 530 ("[T]he silencing of trial participants will become [one of the]
alternative methods used by courts" to block trial publicity.).
72. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL iii (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
73. For several representative examples, see infra notes 91-118 and accompanying text.
74. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
75. See Younger, The Sheppard Mandate Today: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 56 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1977).
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have had reason for concern. The defendant in the Sheppard case was
charged with second-degree murder for the bludgeoning of his preg-
nant wife.76 Allegations of sex and scandal aroused the media's curi-
osity at the outset." Indeed, the trial took place in the "atmosphere
of a 'Roman holiday' for the news media," completely unrestricted by
the trial court.78
Upon conviction, the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus
on the grounds that the state failed to give him a fair trial. 79 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found
in the defendant's favor and granted the writ.80 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.8' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that the defendant had been denied a fair
trial in contravention of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8 2
Writing for the majority, Justice Clark admonished the trial
judge for failing to take measures to insure that the defendant would
receive his constitutional right to a fair trial.8 3 According to the
Court, the trial judge "might well have proscribed extrajudicial state-
ments by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged
prejudicial matters. ' 84 Although this language serves merely as dic-
tum,85 it has assumed dogmatic significance as authorization for indi-
rect gag orders that suppress trial publicity.86
76. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 335.
77. Some of the headlines that appeared during that period included: "Kerr [Captain of
the Cleveland Police] Urges Sheppard's Arrest"; "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?"; "Quit
Stalling-Bring Him In"; and "Blood Is Found In Garage." Id. at 340-42.
78. Id. at 356 (quoting State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 294, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342
(1956)).
79. Id. at 335.
80. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
81. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965).
82. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 335.
83. Id. at 363.
84. Id. at 361.
85. Because the trial judge had not issued a restraining order against the trial participants,
the precise issue of the constitutionality of such an order was not before the Supreme Court at
that time. Nonetheless, some commentators believe that Justice Clark asserted more than
mere dictum. According to Judge Younger, the Court's statement that the judiciary "must
take such steps ... that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences" is
not just a strong suggestion, but rather, the "Sheppard Mandate." Younger, supra note 75, at
6 (quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363); see also Brief for Respondents at 12, Dow Jones & Co.
v. Simon, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988) (No. 88-229) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief in Dow Jones]
(arguing that Sheppard "required" trial judges to avert prejudicial publicity by measures such
as silencing trial participants).
86. Although courts have adopted the Supreme Court's language to justify increased use
of indirect gag orders, the Court's express limitation-a judge may proscribe statements
divulging "prejudicial matters"-arguably undercuts the justification for expansive use of
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The Sheppard dictum has been widely construed as "more nearly
directive than suggestive."87 Following the decision, several organiza-
tions implemented guidelines or standards in response to the Supreme
Court's pronouncement. Their interpretations of Sheppard presumed
that a trial judge's order restraining trial participants from speaking
with the media would invariably pass constitutional muster.88 Given
this formidable reaction to Sheppard from both the judiciary and the
bar, it is not surprising that the past two decades have seen a prolifer-
ation of orders restraining trial participants as a means to indirectly
restrain the press. Courts have employed this safety valve with vigor
despite the availability of other options suggested by both Sheppard
and Nebraska Press.89 Indeed, the "gag" on trial participants has
become one of "the most commonly reported devices" used to effec-
tively muzzle the media. 90
b. The Paradigm Case: In re Dow Jones & Co.
In re Dow Jones & Co.9' provides a typical example of the opera-
tion of an indirect gag order. The controversy in Dow Jones stemmed
from the highly publicized investigation of the Wedtech Corpora-
indirect gag orders. See KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 259, 678
P.2d 431, 444 (1984) (Feldman, J., dissenting). In light of this restriction, one may
persuasively argue that the strong presumption against the constitutional validity of direct gag
orders, as demonstrated by the rigorous tripartite test of Nebraska Press, applies with equal
muscle to indirect gag orders. The first part of the Nebraska Press test requires a close
examination of "the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage." Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976); see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. Thus, if a
court determines that the "nature" of pretrial publicity would not involve "prejudicial
matters," then presumably the imposition of a restraining order, direct or indirect, would
violate the first amendment.
87. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 366 n.8 (4th Cir. 1979).
88. An advisory committee to the American Bar Association initially developed the
Reardon Report, which the ABA approved in 1968 and updated with the Goodwin Report in
1978. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Fair Trial and Free Press (1978). These
guidelines contain a charge that a court, in its discretion, "shall instruct jurors and court
personnel and shall caution parties and witnesses not to make extrajudicial statements relating
to the case or the issues in the case for dissemination by any means of public communication
during the course of the trial." Id. at Standard 8-3.6(c). The Judicial Conference of the
United States issued similar recommendations. See Report of the Committee on the Operation
of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969), supplemented,
51 F.R.D. 135 (1971), revised, 87 F.R.D. 519 (1981). In addition, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain rules
emanating from Sheppard that forbid attorneys from making certain extrajudicial statements.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1983); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983).
89. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
90. D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW, CASES AND COMMENT
521 (3d ed. 1979).
91. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
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tion,92 which implicated several public officials, attorneys, and
Wedtech insiders.93 The investigation prompted an indictment charg-
ing these parties with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), misusing their public offices, and finan-
cially benefitting from the illegal activities of Wedtech. 94 High public
interest in the case triggered "escalating publicity duels" between the
prosecution and the defense, the results of which appeared in major
newspapers.95 Upon the motion of one of the defendants, the district
court issued a broad gag order, which was later modified to restrain
prosecutors, defendants, and defense counsel from making extrajudi-
cial statements concerning the case to the media.96 Various news
agencies appealed from this order.97
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the order did not constitute a prior restraint.98 This quick con-
clusion, however, lacked convincing support. First, the court's dis-
positive distinction reflects only superficial analysis. Specifically, the
court stressed the "fundamental difference between a gag order chal-
lenged by the individual gagged and one challenged by a third
party," 99 relying on the "fact" that the media "cannot be haled into
court for violating [the] terms' of the order. The court failed to
consider, however, that although members of the press cannot be
haled into court in such a situation, they surely can be sent to jail.
Courts have been quite willing to hold reporters in contempt for
refusing to disclose sources who leaked information in contravention
of restraining orders.'' Second, the court's actual methodology dif-
92. The Wedtech investigation examined allegations of fraud, extortion, and bribery in
obtaining federal military defense contracts. Id. at 604.
93. Id. at 605.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 605-06. Although the order did not preclude the reporting of courtroom
activities, it prohibited "virtually all other extrajudicial speech relating to the pending
Wedtech case." Id. at 606.
97. Petitioners included Dow Jones & Co., The New York Times Co., CBS Inc., National
Broadcasting Co., The Associated Press, and Newsday. Id. at 604.
98. Id. at 609.
99. Id. Curiously, petitioners' lead counsel acknowledged this identical point eleven years
earlier in his commentary on Nebraska Press. Respondents' Brief in Dow Jones, supra note 85,
at 7 (citing Sack, supra note 57, at 427-28); see also Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United
States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
100. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608.
101. SENATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 12 (Courts "have not been reluctant to hold the
press responsible when [gag orders against trial participants] are violated."); see, e.g., Farr v.
Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (sustaining
contempt order against reporter who refused to reveal the source who had given him
prohibited information in the Manson case).
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fered considerably from its stated methodology. The court initially
stated that it would analyze the "operation and effect [of the orderi] in
the particular circumstances of this case." 102 In the very next para-
graph, however, the court conceded that although the order "might
have [had] an effect similar to that of a prior restraint," its indirect
nature "deflate[d] what would otherwise be a serious concern regard-
ing judicial censorship of the press."' °3 Thus, any sensitivity to the
"operation and effect" of the order was conspicuously absent despite
the court's claim to the contrary.
c. Conflict in the Appellate Courts
The Court in Dow Jones derived support from an earlier decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,"0 Radio
& Television News Association v. United States District Court.10 5 The
controversy in Radio & Television News arose out of the trial of a
former FBI agent charged with espionage.106 As a precaution, the
trial judge ordered trial counsel to refrain from speaking to the news
media about the case.10 7 On appeal by representatives of the press,
the Ninth Circuit held that the press had no first amendment right to
interview trial participants. 0 8 Without the collateral right to obtain
information from trial participants, there was no information to dis-
seminate and, hence, no prior restraint issue.109
Radio & Television News relied on two related propositions in
determining that the gag order did not violate the first amendment.
First, the court regarded the indirect effect on the media in that case
as "significantly different" than the effect of an order directly
restraining publication." 0 The order did not prohibit the press from
questioning trial counsel; "[t]rial counsel simply [would] not be free to
answer." '  Second, according to the court, the media enjoys a nar-
row right to attend criminal trials which does not encompass unbri-
dled access to trial participants." 2 Specifically, members of the press
102. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608 (emphasis added) (citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1957)).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. ("The Ninth Circuit has drawn the distinction between restraining orders directed
at trial participants challenged by the press and those challenged by trial participants.").
105. 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986).
106. Id. at 1444.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1447.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1446.
111. Id.
112. Id. (The right of access to a trial is no more than the "right to sit, listen, watch, and
report.") (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)).
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hold no more "than a right to attend the trial and report on their
observations." 1 13
The court analogized restraint on trial participants to prohibi-
tions against "leaking" by government officials." 4 Presumably, an
order restraining the press from publishing "leaked" information
would violate the first amendment." 5 On the other hand, the press
would have no grounds to challenge the per se prohibition against
leaking." 6 Thus, the court reasoned that the media's news-gathering
right is derived entirely from a speaker's willingness to speak.'
Although Radio & Television News and Dow Jones appear to rep-
resent the majority opinion on the issue of indirect gag orders,"' some
courts adhere to the view that an indirect gag order represents an
unconstitutional prior restraint. In CBS Inc. v. Young," I 9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed a restraining
order that had been issued in a consolidated civil action 20 arising out
113. Id. at 1447.
114. Id.
115. Id. ("When 'Deep Throat' has spoken and is believed, Woodward, Bernstein and
Bradlee are free to publish.") (quoting Sack, supra note 57, at 420). This statement implicitly
suggests that if trial participants divulge information in contravention of the gag order, then
the media may freely publish that information. Notwithstanding the court's insinuation,
history proves that when journalists publish information gained from "leakers," they run the
risk of a contempt order if they do not expose their sources on demand. See supra note 101
and accompanying text; cf Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708-09 (1972) (Journalists have
no first amendment right to refuse to answer questions during grand jury investigations, even
though confidential sources may be revealed.).
116. Radio & Television News, 781 F.2d at 1447.
117. See id.
118. Other decisions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Central S.C. Chapter,
Soc'y of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1186
(D.S.C.), aff'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); KPNX
Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984); Florida Freedom
Newspapers v. McCrary, 520 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1988).
119. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
120. Id. at 236. Because criminal trials are arguably more sensational than civil trials, it is
not surprising that gag orders represent, for the most part, a criminal justice phenomenon.
Nonetheless, Young demonstrates that gag orders may be issued in civil litigation.
Consequently, the tension between a free press and fair trials also arises in the civil context.
The arguments for a free press are particularly amplified in the civil arena. First,
although the American system of government places a premium on "impartial justice to settle
civil disputes," one can infer from the sixth amendment that criminal trials require an even
"greater insularity against the possibility of [unfairness]." Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). A comparison
of the sixth amendment's "impartial jury" clause to the seventh amendment's "right of trial by
jury" clause quickly demonstrates the constitutional paternalism granted to criminal
defendants. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. Accordingly, fair trial arguments in the
context of civil trials do not rise to the same constitutional height as in criminal trials. Bauer,
522 F.2d at 258. Second, because civil litigation is ordinarily more protracted than a criminal
trial, "there might be a restriction on speech for many years before a complaint is even filed."
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of the 1970 riots at Kent State University. 12' This broad order, which
was challenged only by the news media, 122 directed the parties and
their relatives, friends, and associates to refrain from speaking with
the media regarding the case.123
The Young court noted that the challenged order critically
impinged upon the media's ability to gather information. ' 24 Based on
this observation, the court reached the "inevitable" conclusion that
the order "constitute[d] a prior direct restraint upon freedom of
expression." 125 Unfortunately, the court offerred virtually no reason-
ing to support its conclusion that a restraint on news-gathering consti-
tutes a prior restraint on expression. Without more, this conclusion
may be attacked as unprincipled and vague.126
Nonetheless, the Young opinion persuaded the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Journal Publishing Co. v.
Mechem.'" The issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in
ordering the jurors of a controversial civil rights trial to refrain from
discussing the verdict with anyone. 28  The court determined that
"any inhibitions against news coverage of a trial carry a heavy pre-
sumption of an unconstitutional prior restraint," including restraints
on the gathering of news. 129 Applying this strict test to the order in
dispute, the court held that the order was "impermissibly overbroad"
and, therefore, an unconstitutional infringement upon first amend-
Id. Thus, a gag order in the civil litigation setting would cause significantly more damage to
free speech principles than the relatively short-term criminal gag order. Id. Finally, civil
actions are frequently brought to educate the public on issues of societal importance. Id. For
example, actions have been filed on behalf of the poor to expose "the need for governmental
action or correction." Id. In these cases, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which
silencing trial participants would outweigh the importance of communicating the information
to the public. See id.
121. Young, 522 F.2d at 236.
122. Id. at 240 n.1.
123. Id. at 236; see also supra note 9.
124. Young, 522 F.2d at 239.
125. Id.
126. Some courts have commented on Young's dubious legal significance. See Central S.C.
Chapter, Soc'y of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1186
(D.S.C.), aff'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978) (finding Young
of "questionable authority"); KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 255,
678 P.2d 431, 440 (1984) (noting that "Young was decided without the guidance of the recent
right of access cases"); Florida Freedom Newspapers v. McCrary, 520 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla.
1988) (rejecting Young's "naked assumption that prohibition on comment is a prior
restraint"). But see Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D. Conn. 1987)
(citing Young as persuasive authority).
127. 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Young as persuasive authority).
128. Id. at 1235.
129. Id. at 1236 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361
(9th Cir. 1978)).
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ment principles. 30
Despite its emphatic conclusions, the Mechem opinion exempli-
fies the widespread confusion concerning the doctrine of prior
restraint. In particular, the Mechem court referred to the order in
dispute as a "prior restraint on the gathering of news."' 31 Such a
statement imprecisely merges the concepts of restraint on news-gath-
ering and prior restraint on dissemination.'32 The prior restraint doc-
trine has traditionally functioned as a term of art for the restraint "of
expression in advance of actual publication."' 33 Prior restraint termi-
nology has not been used to refer to restraints on the gathering pro-
cess in advance of expression. Although it might be argued that the
distinction is purely semantic, this Comment will demonstrate that a
determination of the issue in question may be resolved only with
precision. 134
C. A Closer Look at the Prior Restraint Conundrum: A
Definitional Dispute
Resolution of the issue of whether an indirect gag order consti-
tutes a first amendment infringement of the media's rights turns on
one's perspective of the underlying purpose of the prior restraint doc-
trine. That is, does this constitutional principle protect freedom of
expression as a general tenet, or is it more concerned with protecting
the speech of persons who actually possess information that they wish
to communicate? Additionally, if a court determines that the doctrine
focuses on the latter, one must question the validity of the distinction
between persons who actually have information and those who would
have it but for the restraining order. Answers to these questions
depend on whether courts choose to view the issue from a formalistic
perspective or a realistic perspective.
1. THE FORMALISTIC PERSPECTIVE: PROTECTING THE SPEECH OF
''GAGGED" INDIVIDUALS
Appellate courts that have upheld indirect gag orders have ordi-
narily rested their decisions on determinations of whom the
restraining orders specifically name. As stated in Dow Jones:
130. Id. at 1237.
131. Id. at 1236.
132. For another example of the merging of these two concepts, see Connecticut Magazine
v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D. Conn. 1987)' (An order restraining extrajudicial
comment by counsel "constitutes a prior restraint on the right to gather news and derivatively
on publication.").
133. Emerson, supra note 20, at 648 (emphasis added).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 173-77.
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"[T]here is a fundamental difference between a gag order challenged
by the individual gagged and one challenged by a third party; an
order objected to by the former is properly characterized as a prior
restraint, one opposed solely by the latter is not."' 35 This rationale
plainly favors persons who actually possess specific information that
they wish to disseminate.
This position builds on the notion that because an order does not
gag the press per se, no restraint on dissemination takes place, and
there is thus no prior restraint. In a formal sense, one cannot deny
this proposition. An indirect gag order does not prevent the press
from publishing whatever information it can obtain. The order does
not prohibit the press from attending the trial and reporting on those
proceedings. It does not preclude the press from engaging in a scav-
enger hunt and reporting whatever information it can dig up.' 36 It
does not even forbid the press from questioning the trial partici-
pants. '37 To the formalist, this absolute freedom to disseminate what
the press has gathered hardly constitutes a prior restraint on
publication.
The formalistic approach is consistent with the "individual self-
fulfillment" theory of the first amendment, which asserts that "the
free speech clause protects not a marketplace but rather an arena of
individual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions."'
131
In other words, dissemination of "[s]peech is protected not as a means
to a collective good but because of the value of speech conduct to the
individual."' 39 From the formalist's point of view, it is immaterial
that an order restraining trial participants indirectly stifles expression
in the marketplace. To reach the point of unconstitutionality, an
order must restrain "individual liberty," a situation occurring only
when the order prohibits the individual from disseminating informa-
tion within his knowledge.
2. THE REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE
The formalist's stringent approach may be attacked on two
grounds. First, if the critical distinction turns on whom the gag order
135. In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
136. See Sack, supra note 57, at 420.
137. See Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1446
(9th Cir. 1986).
138. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966
(1978); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 (1988)
(suggesting "freedom of speech" may be "an end in itself, an expression of ... the sort of
persons we wish to be"); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF.
L. REV. 422, 424-26 (1980) (summarizing Baker's theme).
139. Baker, supra note 138, at 966.
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restrains, then it is a straw argument to maintain that the press does
not, in fact, fall into that category. Because an indirect gag order
effectively gags the press, it constitutes de facto prior restraint. The
second argument shifts the focal point from who is restrained to what
is restrained. Either way, the voice of reality speaks loud and clear.
a. De Facto Prior Restraint
To the realist, the formalistic argument collapses at the
threshold. Although the literal terms of an indirect gag order only
vicariously affect the press," that is far from the practical result.' 4 '
No doubt, trial courts issue indirect restraining orders in order to pre-
vent the news media from publicly disseminating guarded informa-
tion. 4 2 Thus, the real and intended casualty of an indirect gag order
is undeniably the press. If the saving distinction turns on whom the
order affects, then the media, as the true victim of such an order,
should be saved. In short, because an indirect gag order effectively
restrains the media in advance of publication, such an order consti-
tutes a de facto prior restraint, in spite of the precise terms of the gag
order. 143
140. Even if one assumes that an indirect gag order only indirectly harms the press, the
press may forcefully argue that a literal interpretation of the first amendment forbids any
abridgement whatsoever of the freedom of the press. By definition, "[t]o 'abridge' means not
merely to forbid altogether, but to curtail or to lessen." Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the
Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 111 (1982). Consequently, if a court determines
that a gag order curtails the media's ability to publish in any way, even indirectly, then the gag
order would constitute an impermissible violation of the first amendment. Cf M. NIMMER,
supra note 31, § 4.07, at 4-33 ("State action which does not directly curtail speech rights may
nevertheless be held invalid if abridgment" results.).
141. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 7 ("While the restriction upon the press is an
indirect one, its tendency to cut off news at the source may have the same practical effect as the
imposition of a prior restraint."); cf American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
402 (1950) (Indirect restraints on speech have the "same coercive effect upon the exercise of
First Amendment rights" as direct injunctions.).
142. The plain language of a typical restraining order proves this point. See, e.g., In re Dow
Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir.) (order prohibited trial participants from making-
extrajudicial statements about the case "to any person associated with a public
communications media, or ... that a reasonable person would expect to be communicated to a
public communications media"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
143. To fit into the prior restraint rubric, this argument must presume the availability of a
willing speaker. Without that link, an indirect gag order challenged by the media merely
restrains hypothetical dissemination. This is not a high hurdle, however, because the very
existence of a gag order presupposes the presence of willing speakers. See Dow Jones, 842 F.2d
at 607 ("Without [willing speakers] there would be no need for a restraining order; it would be
superfluous."). But see In re New York Times Co., 878 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1989) (vacating
gag order because trial court failed to identify willing speaker). Obviously, the first amendment
does not compel a source to speak with the media. Cf Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977) (First amendment freedoms include the "right to refrain from speaking at all.").
Consequently, if a trial participant refuses an interview, the press has "no recourse to relief
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The Dow Jones analysis'" represents the antithesis of the de facto
prior restraint theory. In that case, the court's holding turned pre-
cisely on whom the order "gagged."' 4  Because the order did not by
its terms restrain the press from disseminating information, it did not
constitute a prior restraint.1 46 From the realist's perspective, such a
decision irresponsibly ignores the substantive result of the restric-
tion. 47 To escape the formalist's shallow methodology, the realistic
approach mandates consideration of the practical effect of a chal-
lenged restriction, and thereby protects all persons who have indeed
been repressed.
b. Prior Restraint of Expression: Shifting the Focus
from "Who" to "What"
Up to this point, both the formalist's approach and the realist's
de facto prior 'estraint approach have regarded the target of the
restraint as determinative. Arguably, however, the focal point of
analysis would more accurately fall not on whom the gag order
restrains but on what it restrains. That is, rather than charging that a
particular order acts as a prior restraint on the speech of someone, this
approach would hold that the order acts as a prior restraint of expres-
sion in general. 48 This argument effectively places collective expres-
sion on a constitutional pedestal.'49 In sum, this theory condemns
indirect gag orders as unconstitutional restraints of valuable expres-
sion, regardless of who actually possesses the information.150
Supreme Court opinions contain ample references to the protec-
tion of expression in general, as opposed to the protection of speakers
alone. In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,' the seminal American
case on the prior restraint doctrine,' the Court considered whether
based upon the first amendment." Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist.
Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
144. In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
146. See id.
147. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (analyzing first
amendment restriction with "regard to substance and not to mere matters of fbrm").
148. The petitioners in Dow Jones advanced this argument before the United States
Supreme Court on petition for a writ of certiorari. See Brief for Petitioners at 11-14, Dow
Jones & Co. v. Simon, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988) (No. 88-229) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief in Dow
Jones].
149. See infra note 162.
150. This is a particularly potent argument for the press because the validity of the
concomitant rights to gather news and to receive information does not then determine the
outcome. See infra note 162.
151. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
152. See Emerson, supra note 20, at 654.
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"restraint of publication is consistent with the conception of the lib-
erty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed."'' 53
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart I also regarded prior restraint as
an invidious threat against expression in general. Specifically, Chief
Justice Burger stated: "The thread running through all these cases is
that prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."' 5
Additionally, the Court sanctioned the widely recognized metaphor
that while the threat of subsequent punishment " 'chills' speech, prior
restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time."' 56 Despite these statements
from the Supreme Court, courts addressing the indirect gag order
issue have not uniformly treated protection of the message in the same
way that they have treated protection of the source.157
III. ADDITIONAL STRANDS OF ANALYSIS: THE RIGHT TO
GATHER AND THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION
Prior restraint analysis in the context of indirect gag orders
would be amiss absent a consideration of the "right to know" strands
of the first amendment. The right to know comprises the right to
gather news and the right to receive communications.' 8 Professor
Emerson explained the process vividly: "Together [the rights to
gather and to receive information] constitute the reverse side of the
coin from the right to communicate. But the coin is one piece,
153. Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
154. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
155. Id. at 559 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971));
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Carroll v. President &
Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963); Near, 283 U.S. at 697; Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454
(1907)).
156. 427 U.S. at 559 (citing A. BICKEL, supra note 30, at 61). Even in cases in which prior
restraint is not at issue, courts have recognized that the first amendment primarily protects
freedom of expression. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978) (The "proper question" is not whether the party has a first amendment right, but
whether the restriction "abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect.").
157. See supra notes 91-118 and accompanying text. At first glance, the imposition of
indirect gag orders suggests that the constitutional rights of trial participants are somehow
inferior to the rights of journalists. D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, supra note 90, at 529; see also
In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 195 & n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (viewing order directed only against
attorneys and litigants as "less drastic" than order against media). In other words, by issuing
restraining orders against parties, attorneys, witnesses, and court personnel, but not against the
media, the courts seem to be engaged in a "hierarchical approach to the First Amendment."
D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, supra note 90, at 529. The seeming inequity of this situation is
illusory, however, because the "hierarchical approach" actually "hurts the press" by drying up
its sources. Id.
158. See Emerson, supra note 138, at 464.
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namely the system of freedom of expression."'15 9
The right to know becomes more significant when the source is
not "in a position to assert his rights."'" By affording a legal right to
know, the recipient of information may assert a first amendment right
entirely independent of the speaker.' 6' This concept is of obvious
import in the indirect gag order context where, in the absence of a
right to know, the media's right to communicate is arguably derived
from the trial participants' right to speak. 162
Because the media is "the predominant gatherer and dissemina-
tor of information in modem society,"'' 63 the disposition of its right to
know is critical. This issue has provoked a plethora of commentary
on the various prongs of the right to know."M Consequently, this
Comment does not investigate all the nuances of the constitutional
right to know; rather, it addresses the way in which the right to know
is implicated when courts issue indirect gag orders.
A. The Right to Receive Information
The first prong of the constitutional right to know has been iden-
tified as the right to receive information. 65 Although the concept has
not yet been clearly formed, it deserves brief mention here in terms of
the media's right to receive information from trial participants.
Significantly, cases addressing the right to receive information
have determined that the right exists even when potential speakers
have been unable or unwilling to assert a constitutional right to
159. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2; see also
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The freedom to
speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin.").
160. Emerson, supra note 159, at 2.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
377 (1988). The "right to know" theory does not apply to this analysis if one views prior
restraint as constraining expression rather than merely restraining "gagged" individuals. See
supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text. This is the difference: If prior restraint is
unconstitutional because it restrains expression, then the media's news-gathering rights are
irrelevant because the media may claim first amendment infringement regardless of any news-
gathering rights; if prior restraint pertains to the protection of informed sources, however, then
the news-gathering right is instrumental to informing the media and thereby permitting a
claim of prior restraint on dissemination.
163. Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1505, 1506 (1974).
164. A sampling of that commentary includes BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing
Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1980); Emerson,
supra note 159; Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right to Know"?: Access to Government-
Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111 (1987).
165. See Emerson, supra note 159, at 2.
[Vol. 44:165
INDIRECT GAG ORDERS
speak. 66 In the indirect gag order context, willing speakers will often
tactically forgo challenging such orders. For example, a prosecutor
opposing the imposition of a gag order will not vigorously argue for
freedom of speech in fear that the judge might perceive the argument,
notwithstanding the legitimacy of the claim, as a request to try the
case on the courthouse steps. 16 7 Likewise, defendants "may be loath
to challenge an order unrelated to guilt or acquittal before the same
judge who will be presiding over a trial at which their liberty and
property will hang in balance."' 68  In these situations, the media
could conceivably argue that it has a right to receive speech regardless
of the trial participants' unwillingness to challenge the restraining
order.
Despite the seeming appropriateness of these challenges, the judi-
ciary has rejected the correlative right to receive speech in the indirect
gag order setting. Contradicting the very tenets of the right to receive
information, the Dow Jones court held that the right to receive speech
"is entirely derivative of the rights of the trial participants to
speak."' 69 This blanket statement, conspicuously unsupported by any
authority, flies in the face of Supreme Court doctrine that has affirma-
tively upheld the right to receive information apart from the right to
speak. 170
Although the press could arguably rest solely on the right to
receive information, such reliance would not completely protect its
interests. The mere "right to read, to listen, to see, and to otherwise
receive communications" '' 1 does not reach far enough to accommo-
date the media's intentions. Indeed, the media's primary purpose is to
relate what it receives to the public. To that end, the second prong of
the right to know, the right to gather news "as a basis for transmitting
ideas or facts to others," 172 constitutes the better model for analyzing
the indirect gag order issue.
166. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (statute banning price advertisements by pharmacists struck down
upon challenge by consumers, not pharmacists); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63
(1972) (acknowledging right to hear foreign lecturer even though foreigner could not assert
first amendment speech rights); Lamont v. Postmaster, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (upholding
citizens' right to receive communist literature without government interference).
167. Petitioners' Brief in Dow Jones, supra note 148 at 14 n.7.
168. Id.
169. In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
170. See cases cited supra note 166.
171. Emerson, supra note 159, at 2.
172. Id.
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B. The Right to Gather News
As noted earlier, courts often use the concepts of prior restraint
and restraint on news-gathering interchangeably.173 The two con-
cepts are distinct, however, as demonstrated by Professor Emerson's
coin metaphor. 174 The "system of freedom of expression" 175 com-
prises the right to communicate (which is encroached when a restric-
tion acts as a prior restraint) on one side of the coin and the right to
know (which is violated when an order denies the right to gather
news) on the other side of the coin. Yet courts that refer to "prior
restraint on the gathering of news"1 76 are not far off the mark. If one
views prior restraint as an advance restraint on expression in gen-
eral, 177 then a restriction on news-gathering, which is a component of
the "system of freedom of expression," necessarily impinges on that
communicative process. Nevertheless, in the communicative process,
news-gathering serves as the predecessor of expression and not as
expression itself. Therefore, it is preferable to reserve the term "prior
restraint" only for advance restrictions on expression-and not for
constraints on news-gathering. Notwithstanding this terminological
distinction, the right to gather news still greatly impacts upon prior
restraint analysis.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that "without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated."' 78 This press freedom is most frequently asserted as a
right of access to places or persons. 79 In particular, cases dealing
with access to trial and access to prisoners are most analogous to the
circumstances that arise with an indirect gag order.
1. ACCESS TO TRIALS: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
In the landmark right of access case, Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia,'80 the Supreme Court concluded that the press and the
173. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
175. Emerson, supra note 159, at 2.
176. Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986).
177. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
178. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681
(1972), quoted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
179. The Supreme Court has indicated that the terms "right of access" and "right to gather
information" are synonymous. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 ("It is not crucial
whether we describe this right ... as a 'right of access,' . . . or a 'right to gather information'
...."). But see M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 4.08[B], at 4-42 (suggesting that the terms may
have different meanings in different contexts). This Comment uses "right of access" and "right
to gather information" interchangeably.
180. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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public have a first amendment right to attend criminal trials."8' The
case produced six different opinions upholding the right of access to
criminal trials; 8 2 consequently, the scope of Richmond Newspapers
remains an open question. Nevertheless, several themes emerge from
the amalgam of opinions that acknowledge the right of access to crim-
inal trials.
First, the plurality recognized that open criminal trials signifi-
cantly predated the enactment of the first amendment. 83 Accord-
ingly, the Bill of Rights, which "was enacted against the backdrop of
the long history of trials being presumptively open,"' 18 protects the
public's right to view criminal trials. In short, the Constitution's
incorporation of history coupled with "the favorable judgment of
experience" gave justifiable credence to the Court's new-found right
of access. 85
Second, the Court noted that public trials assume a crucial over-
sight function in the administration ofjustice.8 6 With the availability
of instantaneous and widespread news coverage, firsthand observation
of the system now conveniently rests with the media as "surrogates
for the public."' 187 Thus, the media acts on behalf of the public to
assure the integrity of court officials and the judicial process. As reit-
erated by both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan: "Without
publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity,
all other checks are of small account."'' 88
Despite the favorable outcome for first amendment rights, the
press may have difficulty analogizing Richmond Newspapers to indi-
rect gag order cases. Moreover, by deciding only the narrow issue of
access to criminal trials, the Court has yet to determine what standard
181. Although no opinion emerged for the Court, a seven-to-one majority concurred in the
judgment approving the first amendment right of access to criminal trials. Id. at 580 (Burger,
C.J., joined by White and Stevens, JJ.); id. at 598 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 604
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
182. Chief Justice Burger authored the main opinion. Justices White and Stevens filed
concurring opinions. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun wrote opinions concurring in
the judgment. Id. at 555.
183. Id. at 575.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
186. Id. at 569 (plurality); id. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
187. Id. at 573 (plurality).
188. Id. at 569 (plurality) (quoting I J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
524 (1827)); id. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (same); see SENATE REPORT,
supra note 72, at 1; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372; 1 J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN
COMMONWEALTH 514 (rev. ed. 1931); M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF
ENGLAND 344 (6th ed. 1820).
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applies in other situations in which the press seeks the right to gather
news. 89 The Court further noted that the first amendment right to
gather news is not "absolute." 9 ' Finally, the Court's reliance on the
historical underpinnings of the open trial may not carry over to the
asserted right to interview trial participants. On the contrary,
"[n]owhere in the extensive history of the public nature of criminal
trials related in Richmond Newspapers can be found right of access
protection for interviewing trial participants."1 9'
The press may effectively rebut these pitfalls by arguing that it
has a duty, as the public's "watchdog" of the governmental process,
to interview trial participants and to report acquired information to
the public. Significantly, Richmond Newspapers permits the press to
lawfully attend and report on trial proceedings in its role as liaison to
the public. 192 As a result, the eventual issue is whether denial of
media access to trial participants so impairs the media's oversight
function that an expansion of the Richmond Newspapers holding to
the indirect gag order context becomes necessary.
To the press, the right to attend and report on trial events is
"illusory" 193 without interpretation of those events by trial partici-
pants. Clearly, an indirect, noninterpretative trial record cannot
effectively substitute for the intrinsic communicative qualities of face-
to-face exchange.' 94 Moreover, the "wall of secrecy" transforms the
right to attend trial into nothing more than "a method by which the
government uses the press as a conduit to transmit the official line."' 9'
Surely, situations arise in which crucial information may be obtained
only by interviewing trial participants and not solely by attending a
trial. For example, an attorney who is concerned about a particular
judge's trial management may not, under risk of contempt for viola-
189. See M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 4.09[B], at 4-44.
190. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18; cf Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)
("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information.").
191. See KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 256, 678 P.2d 431, 441
(1984).
192. See Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1446
(9th Cir. 1986); KPNX Broadcasting, 139 Ariz. at 254, 678 P.2d at 439. But cf NLRB v. Fruit
& Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 80 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) ("First
Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away by degrees than by one fell swoop.").
193. KPNX Broadcasting, 139 Ariz. at 259, 678 P.2d at 444 (Feldman, J., dissenting).
194. Cf Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (recognizing that "alternative
means of access" to certain information may not share the "particular qualities inherent in
sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning").
195. KPNX Broadcasting, 139 Ariz. at 259, 678 P.2d at 444 (Feldman, J., dissenting). In
his dissent in KPNX Broadcasting, Justice Feldman also quipped that the right to attend trial
"is the same right that government has graciously given the press in totalitarian societies such
as Argentina, China and the Soviet Union." Id.
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tion of a gag order, convey that concern until the trial ends.
Although certain remedial measures may be available following trial,
the prompt reaction that news coverage elicits cannot be lightly
dismissed. 196
Despite the media's claims, valid arguments to the contrary com-
pel serious consideration. In particular, one must question whether
fulfillment of the "watchdog" role truly requires the additional infor-
mation obtained from interviewing trial participants. Before a news
agency can effectively act as a "watchdog," it must perform as a busi-
ness. Given the latter mission, the financial necessity to sell its prod-
uct conceivably taints the media's desire to interview trial
participants. The insatiable curiosity of the American public thus has
the journalist walking a fine line between responsible journalism and
sensational, yet profitable, news coverage. 197 In light of the media's
questionable intentions, the risk of publishing inadmissible informa-
tion arguably weighs against finding a news-gathering right to inter-
view trial participants. 198
2. ACCESS TO PRISONERS: Pell v. Procunier AND Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.
The prisoner access cases involved concerns of the same type
raised in indirect gag order cases. In both Pell v. Procunier ' 99 and
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. ,2oo the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether prison regulations prohibiting interviews between journalists
and specifically designated inmates violated the first amendment. 2 1
The facts in the cases were virtually the same, except that in Pell, the
196. But see Gellhorn, The Right to Know. First Amendment Overbreadth?, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 25, 27 ("A gag order does not forever block critical comment upon the prosecution or
the judge. The crucial question is whether . . . the health of society is furthered by the
speediest possible news reporting.").
197. The Warren Commission, in its report of the media's conduct during the days
following President Kennedy's assassination, admonished the press for choosing the
sensational route: "[T]he public['s] ... curiosity should not have been satisfied at the expense
of the accused's right to a trial by an impartial jury. The courtroom, not the newspaper or
television screen, is the appropriate forum in our system for the trial of a man accused of a
crime." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY 219, 240 (1964). In retrospect, theorists now believe that "as a result of the
conduct of the Dallas police and the communication media .... [Oswald] could not have had
a fair trial anywhere in the United States." A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND
PUBLICITY 315 (1967) (quoting the American Civil Liberties Union without citation).
198. See Respondents' Brief in Dow Jones, supra note 85, at 14 (The restraining order
merely prohibits the media from gathering "sensational characterizations and matters beyond
the public record"; the "public will not be cheated by that limitation.").
199. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
200. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
201. Id. at 844-45; Pell, 417 U.S. at 819.
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Court reviewed a state regulation 20 2 while in Saxbe, the Court
reviewed a federal regulation.2 °3
The disputes arose when journalists were denied access to specific
prisoners who were willing to be interviewed. 2° In denying the
media's first amendment challenge,20 5 the Court found the availability
of alternative news-gathering mechanisms determinative.20 6 Specifi-
cally, the regulations "accorded full opportunities to observe prison
conditions" and to "speak about any subject to any inmates whom
they might encounter."20 7 The Court's rationale sounds similar to the
reasoning in some of the indirect gag order cases that stress the
media's full opportunity to attend and report on a trial, despite lack of
access to trial participants.20 8
At first glance, Pell and Saxbe appear to cut against the media's
claim for first amendment protection from an indirect gag order. Pro-
fessor Nimmer's provocative distinction between non-speech and anti-
speech restrictions209 suggests a different result, however. According
to Professor Nimmer, a non-speech restriction occurs when "the mere
operation of the communicative process regardless of the message"
threatens the protected interest.2"0 More specifically, a non-speech
restriction attaches "if the interests asserted are injured not by the
subsequent publication of the information gathered, but rather by the
very presence of the information gatherer. ' 21 1 On the other hand, an
anti-speech restriction arises when the content of the message itself
threatens the competing interest.21 2
The prisoner access cases demonstrate how the non-speech
model functions. The regulations in Pell and Saxbe purported to
202. Pell, 417 U.S. at 819.
203. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844.
204. Id.; Pell, 417 U.S. at 820-21.
205. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850; Pell, 417 U.S. at 835. For criticism of this holding, see M.
NIMMER, supra note 31, § 4.09[B], at 4-48; Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1975).
206. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 847-48; Pell, 417 U.S. at 830. The Court was also persuaded by
earlier doctrine holding that the press does not have "a constitutional right of special access to
information not available to the public generally." Id. at 833-34 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972)). This argument does not apply in the indirect gag order setting
because the press does not seek to be treated differently than the general public. Indeed, if the
trial participants were free from the gag order, the press and public would have equal
opportunity to gather information.
207. Pell, 417 U.S. at 830; see also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 847.
208. See, e.g., Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443,
1446 (9th Cir. 1986).
209. M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 4.09[B], at 4-45.
210. Id. at 4-46.
211. Id. at 4-56.
212. Id. at 4-46.
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maintain discipline within the prison.2 13 Because unrestrained access
to prisoners would jeopardize that purpose regardless of the content
of the subsequent dissemination, the regulations operated as non-
speech restrictions and were thus presumptively valid.214 This theory
suggests that the Court decided Pell and Saxbe correctly.
The characteristics delineating the dichotomy between non-
speech and anti-speech indicate that indirect gag orders constitute
anti-speech restrictions. A judge typically issues a gag order in the
interest of a defendant's right to a fair trial. The media's access to
trial participants does not independently threaten this interest.
Rather, gag orders are issued to prevent the press from publishing
information that judges would deem prejudicial at trial.215 In short,
only the message that might be communicated-not the communica-
tive process itself-threatens the right to a fair trial.
The constitutionality of an anti-speech restriction depends upon
whether the first amendment provides protection for the content of
the communication.2" 6 That is, the "right to gather information is as
strong or as weak as the right to communicate the information once it
has been gathered. '21 7 Consequently, the Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart decision,21 ' which dealt with the media's right to disseminate
previously gathered information, should govern the media's right to
gather information from trial participants. Under the Nebraska Press
scheme, gag orders must survive a tripartite balancing test in order to
validate restraints on dissemination.219 Accordingly, if a court con-
cludes that news coverage might impinge upon the defendant's right
to a fair trial, if less restrictive alternatives are completely unavailable,
and if the restraining order would effectively preserve the integrity of
the trial, 220 then the right to communicate evaporates221' and its con-
213. See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 848-49; Pell, 417 U.S. at 831-32; M. NIMMER, supra note 31,
§ 4.09[B], at 4-46.
214. M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 4.09[B], at 4-46.
215. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
216. M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 4.09[B], at 4-53.
217. Id. at 4-54.
218. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
219. Id. at 562.
220. Id.
221. Contrary to this hypothetical, in all likelihood, a restraining order would not clear all
three hurdles. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Fair Trial and Free Press, Standard
8-3.1 commentary at 8-29 (1978) (The drafters noted that the "circumstances under which
prior restraints could constitutionally be imposed are extremely limited" after Nebraska Press;
consequently, the ABA's decision to categorically prohibit direct restraints on the press is
"neither radical nor unwarranted."); L. TRIBE, supra note 138, § 12-11, at 858-59 (suggesting
that the Court has "announced a virtual bar to prior restraints on reporting of news about
crime"); Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 497, 504 (1977) ("[I]t seems difficult
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comitant right to gather news becomes superfluous. Conversely, if a
court finds, that the press has a right to publish trial information that
is already in its possession, then an anti-speech restriction prohibiting
the press from access to trial participants would violate first amend-
ment principles.222
IV. CONCLUSION
The emerging popularity of indirect gag orders has essentially
prompted an end run around Nebraska Press. With the narrow hold-
ing of Nebraska Press firmly in grip, trial judges invite reversals when
they issue orders directly restraining the press. The import of the
Nebraska Press holding, however, is rendered meaningless by what
appears to be judicial "magic." By pulling the indirect gag order out
of the judge's hat, courts diminish the significance of Nebraska Press.
When faced with a high profile trial, judges can now effectively muz-
zle the press, via an order restraining the trial participants, without
employing the prohibited direct gag order. In this manner, courts
avoid blatant violations of Nebraska Press while magically achieving
the same suppressive result that Nebraska Press rejected. Unlike
magicians, however, courts should not be in the business of creating
illusion.
The Supreme Court viewed the direct restraint on publication as
"one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurispru-
dence. ' 223 This position should not be undercut by the wave of a
wand. Rather, courts should evaluate indirect gag orders with the
same standards that are applied to direct gag orders. Initially, judges
must examine the probable nature and extent of press activity.224 In
addition, judges must rigorously explore other alternatives, such as
change of venue, continuance, in-depth voir dire, and sequestration of
jurors, 22 5 before they employ the ultimate safety device. Finally,
courts must scrutinize the efficacy of restraining orders in the particu-
lar circumstances of each case.2 26
Understandably, the Nebraska Press Court declined to decide the
to believe that any other case will provide an exception to the rule against prior restraints in
fair trial/free press cases."). But see Sack, supra note 57, at 414 (arguing that the Court's
balancing approach insufficiently protects the press).
222. Cf Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) ("The First
Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously
enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment
of other First Amendment rights.").
223. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 563-64.
226. Id. at 562.
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propriety of indirect gag orders on the facts presented. But when it
denies certiorari to cases that do embrace the proper facts, 2 27 the
Supreme Court risks the complete evisceration of Nebraska Press.
One must consider the legitimacy of obliterating constitutional doc-
trine with a mere gossamer. In any event, the Supreme Court should
accept the next opportunity to hear the issue. Only an unequivocal
pronouncement from the highest court in the land will permit lower
courts to issue indirect gag orders with integrity.
SHERYL A. BJORK
227. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
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